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ABSTRACT
The sparse vector technique is a powerful differentially
private primitive that allows an analyst to check whether
queries in a stream are greater or lesser than a thresh-
old. This technique has a unique property – the algo-
rithm works by adding noise with a finite variance to
the queries and the threshold, and guarantees privacy
that only degrades with (a) the maximum sensitivity of
any one query in stream, and (b) the number of positive
answers output by the algorithm. Recent work has de-
veloped variants of this algorithm, which we call gener-
alized private threshold testing, and are claimed to have
privacy guarantees that do not depend on the number
of positive or negative answers output by the algorithm.
These algorithms result in a significant improvement in
utility over the sparse vector technique for a given pri-
vacy budget, and have found applications in frequent
itemset mining, feature selection in machine learning
and generating synthetic data.
In this paper we critically analyze the privacy prop-
erties of generalized private threshold testing. We show
that generalized private threshold testing does not sat-
isfy ǫ-differential privacy for any finite ǫ. We identify
a subtle error in the privacy analysis of this technique
in prior work. Moreover, we show an adversary can use
generalized private threshold testing to recover counts
from the datasets (especially small counts) exactly with
high accuracy, and thus can result in individuals being
reidentified. We demonstrate our attacks empirically on
real datasets.
1. INTRODUCTION
A popular building block for ǫ-differentially private
query answering is the Laplace mechanism. Given a set
of queriesQ as input, the Laplace mechanism adds noise
drawn independently from the Laplace distribution to
each query in Q. Adding noise with standard deviation
of
√
2/ǫ to each of the queries in Q ensures (∆Q · ǫ)-
differential privacy, where ∆Q is the sensitivity of Q,
or the sum of the changes in each of the queries Q ∈
Q when one row is added or removed from the input
database. Increasing the number of queries increases
the sensitivity, and thus for a fixed privacy budget the
mechanism’s accuracy is poor for large sets of queries
(unless the queries operate on disjoint subsets of the
domain).
The sparse vector technique (SVT) [7] is an algorithm
that allows testing whether a stream of queries is greater
or lesser than a threshold τ . SVT works by adding
noise to both the threshold τ and to each of the queries
Q ∈ Q. If noise with standard deviation of √2/ǫ is
added to the threshold and each of the queries, SVT
can be shown to satisfy c∆ǫ-differential privacy, where
∆ is the maximum sensitivity of any single query in Q
and c is the number of positive answers (greater than
threshold) that the algorithm outputs. Note that the
privacy guarantee does not depend on the number of
queries with negative answers, and the sensitivity does
not necessarily increase with an increase in number of
queries.
Recent work has explored the possibility of extending
this technique to eliminate the dependence on the num-
ber of positive answers (c). We call this idea generalized
private threshold testing, and it works like SVT – noise
is added to both the threshold and each of the queries
using noise whose standard deviation only depends only
on ǫ and maximum sensitivity ∆ of a single query in Q.
Generalized private threshold testing has been claimed
to ensure differential privacy with the privacy parame-
ter having no dependence on the number of positive or
negative queries! Hence, generalized private threshold
testing has been used to develop algorithms with high
utility for private frequent itemset mining [6], feature
selection in private classification [9] and generating syn-
thetic data [2].
In this article, we critically analyze the privacy prop-
erties of generalized private threshold testing. We make
the following contributions:
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• We show that generalized private threshold testing
does not satisfy ǫ-differential privacy, where ǫ does
not depend on the number of queries being tested.
We identify a specific claim in the privacy analysis
in prior work that is assumed to hold, but does not
in reality.
• We show specific examples of neighboring databases,
queries and outputs that violate the requirement
that the algorithm output is insensitive to adding
or removing a row in the data.
• We display an attack algorithm and demonstrate
that using generalized private threshold testing
could make it possible for adversaries to recon-
struct the counts for each cell with high probabil-
ity, especially the cells with small counts.
Organization: Section 2 surveys concepts on differen-
tial privacy and the sparse vector technique. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce generalized private threshold test-
ing and its instantiations in prior works. We show that
generalized private threshold testing does not satisfy
differential privacy in Section 4. We describe an at-
tack algorithm for reconstructing the counts of cells in
the input datasets by using generalized private thresh-
old testing in Section 5 and demonstrate our attacks on
real datasets.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Databases: A databaseD is a multiset of entries whose
values come from a domain T = {u1, u2, . . . , uk}. Let
n = |D| denote the number of entries in the database.
We represent a database D as a histogram of counts
over the domain. That is, D is represented as a vector
x ∈ Nk where x[i] or xi denotes the true count of entries
in D with the ith value of the domain T .
Differential Privacy: We define a neighborhood rela-
tion N on databases as follows: Two databases D1 and
D2 are considered neighboring datasets if and only if
they differ in the presence or absence of a single entry.
That is, (D1, D2) ∈ N iff for some t ∈ T , D1 = D2∪{t}
or D2 = D1 ∪ {t}. Equivalently, if x1 and x2 are his-
tograms of neighboring databases, ||x1 − x2||1 = 1. An
algorithm satisfies differential privacy if its outputs are
statistically similar on neighboring databases.
Definition 1 (ǫ-differential privacy). A ran-
domized algorithm M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if
for any pair of neighboring databases (D1, D2) ∈ N ,
and ∀S ∈ range(M),
Pr[M(D1) = S] ≤ eǫ · P [M(D2) = S] (1)
The value of ǫ, called privacy budget, controls the level
of the privacy, and limits how much an adversary can
distinguish one dataset with its neighboring datasets
given an output. Smaller ǫ’s correspond to more privacy.
Differentially private algorithms satisfy the following
composition properties. SupposeM1(·) andM2(·) be ǫ1-
and ǫ2-differentially private algorithms.
• Sequential Compositon: Releasing the outputs of
M1(D) andM2(D) satisfies ǫ1+ǫ2-differential pri-
vacy.
• Parallel Composition: ReleasingM1(D1) andM2(D2),
where D1∩D2 = ∅ satisfies max(ǫ1, ǫ2)-differential
privacy.
• Postprocessing: For any algorithm M3(·), releas-
ing M3(M1(D)) still satisfies ǫ1-differential pri-
vacy. That is, postprocessing an output of a dif-
ferentially private algorithm does not incur any
additional loss of privacy.
Thus, complex differentially private algorithms can be
build by composing simpler private algorithms. Laplace
Mechanism [3] is one such widely used building that
achieves differential privacy that adds noise from a Laplace
distribution with a scale proportional to the global sen-
sitivity.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity). The global sen-
sitivity of a fuction f : D → Rn, denoted as ∆(f), is
defined to be the maximum L1 distance of the output
from any two neighboring datasets D1 and D2.
∆(f) = max
(D1,D2)∈N
||f(D1)− f(D2)||1 (2)
Definition 3 (Laplace Mechanism). For any func-
tion f : D → Rd, the Laplace MechanismM is given by:
M(D) = f(D) + η. η is a vector of independent ran-
dom variables drawn from a Laplace distribution with
the probability density fuction p(x|λ) = 1
2λ
e−|x|/λ, where
λ = ∆(f)/ǫ.
Theorem 1. Laplace Mechanism satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy.
Sparse Vector Technique:
Algorithm 1 shows the details of the sparse vector
technique (SVT). The input of SVT is a stream of queries
Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qk}, where each query q ∈ Q has sensi-
tivity bounded by ∆, a threshold θ, and a limit c. For
every query, SVT outputs either ⊥ (negative response)
or ⊤ (positive response). SVT works in two steps: (1)
Perturb the threshold θ by adding noise drawn from the
Laplace distribution with scale 2
ǫ
, getting θ˜. (2) Perturb
each query qi adding Laplace noise (Lap(
2c
ǫ∆
)) getting
q˜. Output ⊥ if q˜i < θ˜ and ⊤ otherwise. This algorithm
stops when it outputs c positive responses.
Theorem 2. [4] SVT satisfies ǫ-differential privacy.
Moreover if the number of queries is k and their max
sensitivity ∆, with probability at least 1 − δ, for every
ai = ⊤, qi > τ − α and for every ai = ⊥, qi < τ + α,
where
α = O(
c∆
ǫ
· (log k + log(2/δ))
2
Algorithm 1 Sparse Vector Technique
Input: Dataset D, a stream of queries q1, q2, . . . with
bounded sensitivity ∆, threshold θ, a cutoff point c and
privacy budget ǫ
Output: a stream of answers
1: θ˜ ← θ + Lap(2∆/ǫ), count← 0
2: for each query i do
3: vi ← Lap(2∆ ∗ c/ǫ)
4: if qi(D) + vi ≥ θ˜ then
5: Output vi = ⊤
6: count← count + 1
7: else
8: Output vi = ⊥
9: end if
10: if count ≥ c then
11: Abort
12: end if
13: end for
3. GENERALIZED PRIVATE THRESH-
OLD TESTING
In this section, we describe a method called Gener-
alized Private Threshold Testing (GPTT) (see Algo-
rithm 2) that generalizes variations of the sparse vector
technique that do not require a limit on the number of
positive (or negative) responses.
GPTT takes as input a dataset D, a set of queries
Q = {q1, . . . , qn} with bounded sensitivity ∆, thresh-
old θ and a privacy budget ǫ. For every query GPTT
outputs either ⊥ or ⊤ that approximates whether or
not the queries are smaller than the threshold. GPTT
works exactly like SVT – the threshold is perturbed us-
ing noise drawn from Lap(∆/ǫ1) and the queries are
perturbed using noise from Lap(∆/ǫ2), and the output
is computed by comparing the noisy query answer with
the noisy threshold. The only difference is that there is
no limit on the number of positive or negative queries.
GPTT is a generalization of variations presented in
prior work. Lee and Clifton [6] used GPTT for pri-
vate frequent itemset mining with ǫ1 =
ǫ
4
and ǫ2 =
3ǫ
4
.
Chen et al [2] instantiate GPTT with ǫ1 = ǫ2 =
ǫ
2
, for
generating synthetic data. Stoddard et al [9] observed
that the privacy guarantee does not depend on ǫ2 and
propose the Private Threshold Testing algorithm that
is identical to GPTT with ǫ1 = ǫ and ǫ2 = ∞. Private
threshold testing was used for private feature selection
for classification.
3.1 Privacy Analysis of GPTT
We now extend the privacy analysis from prior work
[6, 2, 9] to generalized private threshold testing. We
will show in the next section that this privacy analysis
is flawed and that GPTT does not satisfy differential
privacy.
Given any set of queries Q = {q1, . . . , qn}, let the
vector v =< v1, . . . , vn >∈ {⊥,⊤}n denote the output
of GPTT. Given any two neighbering databases D1 and
Algorithm 2 Generalized Private Threshold Testing
Input: Dataset D, a set of queries Q = {q1, . . . , qn} with
bounded sensitivity ∆, threshold θ, privacy parameters
ǫ1, ǫ2
Output: A vector of answers v = [v1, v2, . . . , vn] ∈
{⊥,⊤}n
1: θ˜ ← θ + Lap(∆/ǫ1)
2: for qi ∈ Q do
3: q˜i ← qi(D) + Lap(∆/ǫ2)
4: if q˜i < θ˜ then
5: vi ← ⊥
6: else
7: vi ← ⊤
8: end if
9: end for
10: return v
D2, let V1 and V2 denote the output distribution on v
when D1 and D2 are the input databases, respectively.
We use v<t to denote t−1 previous answers(i.e., v<t =<
v1, . . . , vt−1 >). Then we have
V1(v)
V2(v)
=
∏n
i=1 V1(vi = ai | v<i)∏n
i=1 V2(vi = ai | v<i)
=
∏
i:ai=⊤
V1(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
V2(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
∏
i:ai=⊥
V1(vi = ⊥ | v<i)
V2(vi = ⊥ | v<i)
Let Hi(x) be the probability that qi is positive (i.e.,
vi = ⊤) in D when the noisy threshold is x. That is,
Hi(x) = P [vi = ⊤ | θ˜ = x,v<i]
Then, given a specific noisy threshold θ˜ = x, the prob-
ability that vi = ⊤ is independent of the answers to
previous queries. That is,
Hi(x) = P [vi = ⊤ | x,v<i] = P [vi = ⊤ | x] (3)
Thus, if f(y;µ, λ) = 1
2λ
exp(− |y−µ|
λ
), then
Hi(x) =
∫ ∞
x
f(y; qi,
∆
ǫ2
)dy =
∫ ∞
x+∆
f(y; qi +∆,
∆
ǫ2
)dy
Prior work uses the above property of Hi(x) to show
that GPTT satisfies 2ǫ1-differential privacy.
Let S = {i | ai = ⊤ and qi(D1) = qi(D2)} and
S¯ = {i | ai = ⊤ and qi(D1) 6= qi(D2)}.
∏
i:ai=⊤
V1(vi = ⊤ | v<i) =
∏
i∈S
V1(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
∏
i∈S¯
V1(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
LetH1i (x) andH
2
i (x) denote the probability that vi = ⊤
inD1 andD2, resp., when the noisy threshold is x. Then
3
we have,
∏
i∈S
V1(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
P [θ˜ = x]
∏
i∈S
H1i (x)dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
P [θ˜ = x]
∏
i∈S
H2i (x)dx since qi(D1) = qi(D2)
=
∏
i∈S
V2(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
∏
i∈S¯
V1(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
P [θ˜ = x]
∏
i∈S¯
H1i (x)dx
≤ exp(ǫ1)
∫ ∞
−∞
P [θ˜ = x−∆]
∏
i∈S¯
H2i (x−∆)dx
=
∏
i∈S¯
V2(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
Thus, it is seen that
∏
i:ai=⊤
V1(vi = ⊤ | v<i) ≤ exp(ǫ1)
∏
i:ai=⊤
V2(vi = ⊤ | v<i)
Similarly,
∏
i:ai=⊥
V1(vi = ⊥ | v<i) ≤ exp(ǫ1)
∏
i:ai=⊥
V2(vi = ⊥ | v<i)
Therefore, V1(v)
V2(v)
≤ exp(2ǫ1)
Remarks: Note that adding noise to the queries is not
really required. The above proof will go through even if
ǫ2 =∞. In fact as we will see next, we can achieve the
same utility no matter what the value of ǫ2 is.
3.2 Utility of GPTT
We first consider the utility of the case when ǫ2 =∞
(i.e. no noise added to queries), and show that we can
achieve (almost) the same utility even when ǫ2 is finite.
Theorem 3. For GPTT with parameters ǫ1 and ǫ2 =
∞, with the probability at least 1 − δ, vi = ⊥ implies
qi < θ + α and vi = ⊤ implies qi > θ − α, where
α =
∆
ǫ1
log(
1
δ
)
where ∆ is the max sensitivity of input queries.
Proof. All we need to show is that the noise added
to the threshold is at most ±α with probability 1 − δ.
Since θ˜ = θ + Lap(∆
ǫ1
), we have
P (|θ˜ − θ|) < α) ≥ 1− δ
⇒ P (−α < Lap(∆
ǫ1
) < α) ≥ 1− δ
⇒ P (Lap(∆
ǫ1
) > α) ≤ δ
2
⇒ 1− (1− 1
2
exp(− ǫ1α
∆
)) ≤ δ
2
⇒ α ≥ ∆
ǫ1
log(
1
δ
)
Now we extend the utility for GPTT when ǫ2 <∞.
Theorem 4. Let D be a database and Q a query set
with maximum sensitivity of ∆. For every β, δ > 0, we
can use GPTT with parameters ǫ1, ǫ2 <∞ to determine
whether qi < θ + α or qi > θ − α for any qi ∈ Q, with
probability (1− δ)(1− β), where
α =
∆
ǫ1
log(
1
δ
)
Proof. Since the privacy of GPTT does not depend
on the number of queries Q (as long as sensitivity is
bounded by ∆), we can consider a new query set Q′
that has t copies {qi1, qi2, . . . , qit} of each query qi ∈ Q.
Then for each query qi ∈ Q, we have t independent
comparisons of the noisy query answer q˜ij and the noisy
threshold θ˜. We use the majority of these t results to
determine whether qi is smaller or greater than θ˜.
We can show that with probability at least 1− β, we
can correctly identify whether qi(D) is greater or lesser
than the noisy threshold θ˜.
Without loss of generality, suppose qi < θ˜, then p =
P (q˜i < θ˜) >
1
2
. Let {Xj , j ≥ 1} be an sequence of
i.i.d. binary random variables with expected E[Xj ] = p,
where Xj is 1 if q˜ij < θ˜ and 0 otherwise. Based on the
law of large numbers, for any positive number γ we have
lim
t→∞
Pr(|1
t
(X1 + · · ·+Xt)− p| > γ) = 0
⇒ lim
t→∞
Pr(X1 + · · ·+Xt > t
2
) = 1
Thus, there exists a number t s.t. for every qi ∈
Q, we can determine whether qi is smaller or greater
than θ˜ with probability greater than 1− β
|Q|
. So all the
qi will be correctly judged with probability equals to
(1− β
|Q|
)|Q| ≈ 1− β.
We get the desired result by now combining with the
proof of Theorem 3.
We can see that the information leaked by GPTT with
ǫ2 < ∞ will tend to the information leaked by GPTT
with ǫ2 =∞ as the number of copies t goes to infinity.
Thus, we can just focus on the case when ǫ2 =∞.
4
4. GPTT IS NOT PRIVATE
While prior work claims that GPTT is indeed dif-
ferentially private (as discussed in Section 3), we show
that this algorithm does not satisfy the privacy condi-
tion. The proof is constructive and will show examples
of pairs of neighboring datasets and queries for which
GPTT violates differential privacy.
Theorem 5. GPTT does not satisfy ǫ-differential pri-
vacy for any finite ǫ.
In the proof of this theorem, we start with the case
of ǫ2 = ∞, where the true query answer is compared
with the noisy threshold. It is easy to show that GPTT
does not satisfy differential privacy in this case, since
deterministic information about the queries is leaked.
In particular, if vi = ⊥ and vj = ⊤, we are certain
that on the input database D, there is some x such that
qi(D) < x ≤ qj(D).
The proof of the more general case follows from The-
orem 4 which shows that anything that is disclosed by
GPTT with ǫ2 =∞ is also disclosed with high probabil-
ity (by making sufficient number of copies of the input
queries). We present the formal proof below.
Proof. Consider two queries q1 and q2 with sensi-
tivity 1. For special case of GPTT, where ǫ2 = ∞,
suppose in dataset D, q1(D) = 0 and q2(D) = 1. Also
suppose in a neighboring dataset D′, q1(D
′) = 1 and
q2(D
′) = 0. Let the threshold θ be 0. Then, the prob-
ability of getting an output v1 = ⊥ and v2 = ⊤ is > 0
under database D; this corresponds to the probability
that the noisy threshold is within (0, 1). However, un-
der the neighboring dataset D′, P [v1 = ⊥, v2 = ⊤] = 0.
This is because q1(D
′) > q2(D
′). Thus for any noisy
threshold θ˜,
v1 = ⊥ =⇒ q1(D′) < θ˜ =⇒ q2(D′) < θ˜ =⇒ v2 = ⊥
Hence, GPTT with ǫ2 =∞ does not satisfy differential
privacy.
To prove that GPTT does not satisfy differential pri-
vacy when ǫ2 < ∞, we construct a similar counterex-
ample as above, except that we use t copies of q1 and
q2. So again, let the query set Q = {q1, . . . , q2t} be
such that on dataset D, q1(D) = . . . = qt(D) = 0 and
qt+1(D) = . . . = q2t(D) = 1. We assume all queries
have sensitivity 1. On neighboring dataset D′, q1(D) =
. . . = qt(D) = 1 and qt+1(D) = . . . = q2t(D) = 0. Let
the threshold θ = 0. Let the output vector v be such
that v1 = . . . = vt = ⊥ and vt+1 = . . . = v2t = ⊤. Then
we have:
V (v) = P [GPTT (D) = v]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
P (θ˜ = z)
t∏
i=1
P (q˜i < z)
2t∏
i=t+1
P (q˜i ≥ z)dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z)(1− Fǫ2(z − 1)))tdz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
where fǫ(z) and Fǫ(z) are the pdf and cdf respectively of
the Laplace distribution with parameter 1/ǫ. Similarly,
we have on the neighboring database D′,
V ′(v) = P [GPTT (D′) = v]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z − 1) − Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
Let V ′(v) = α and let δ = |F−1ǫ1 (α4 )|. Since α ≤ 1, δ is
greater than the 75th percentile of a Laplace distribution
with scale 1/ǫ1. That is,
α
2
=
∫ −δ
−∞
fǫ1(t)dt+
∫ ∞
δ
fǫ1(t)dt
Moreover, note that since Fǫ2(z − 1) < Fǫ2(z) for all z,
we have
1 < κ(z) =
Fǫ2(z)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1)
Fǫ2(z − 1)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1)
Let κ denote the minimum value κ(z) takes over all
z ∈ [−δ, δ]; thus κ > 1.
Now we get
V ′(v) = α
=
∫ ∞
−∞
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z − 1)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
<
∫
z 6∈[−δ,δ]
fǫ1(z)dz +
∫ δ
−δ
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z − 1)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
=
α
2
+
∫ δ
−δ
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z − 1)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdt
Thus, we have
∫ δ
−δ
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z − 1)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
>
1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z − 1)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
Therefore,
V (v) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
>
∫ δ
−δ
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z)− Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
>
∫ δ
−δ
fǫ1(t)(Fǫ2(z − 1) − Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tκtdz
>
κt
2
∫ ∞
−∞
fǫ1(z)(Fǫ2(z − 1) − Fǫ2(z)Fǫ2(z − 1))tdz
=
κt
2
V ′(v)
Since κ > 1, for every ǫ > 1 there exists a t such that
V (v) > eǫV ′(v) which violates differential privacy.
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4.1 Intuition
We believe that there is a subtle error in the privacy
analysis in prior work (discussed in Section 3). Prior
work splits the probability V (v) as:
V (v) =
∏
i:vi=⊥
P [vi = ⊥|v<i]
∏
i:vi=⊤
P [vi = ⊤|v<i]
=
∫
f(x)
∏
i:vi=⊥
P [vi = ⊥|x,v<i]dx
×
∫
f(x)
∏
i:vi=⊤
P [vi = ⊤|x,v<i]dx
=
∫
f(x)
∏
i:vi=⊥
P [vi = ⊥|x]dx
×
∫
f(x)
∏
i:vi=⊤
P [vi = ⊤|x]dx
where f(x) = P [θ˜ = x]. This decomposition into ⊤
and ⊥ answers are wrong. The main problem comes
from the fact that it uses the unconditioned f(x) for
all queries, but the distribution of the noisy threshold
would be affected given the previous output. To take
a simple example, let q1 = m > 0, q2 = 0, θ = 0 and
assume v1 = ⊥, v2 = ⊤. For ease of explanation assume
ǫ2 = ∞ (but the argument would work for finite ǫ2 as
well). Now we can compute the probability of GPTT
outputing v1, v2 as
P (v1 = ⊥, v2 = ⊤) = P (v1 = ⊥)P (v1 = ⊥ | v2 = ⊤)
= P (v1 = ⊥)P (m < θ˜ | 0 ≥ θ˜) = 0
However, if we use the expression above, we have
V (v) =
∏
i:vi=⊥
P [vi = ⊥|v<i]
∏
i:vi=⊤
P [vi = ⊤|v<i]
=
∫
f(x)P (v1 = ⊥ | x)dx×
∫
f(x)P (v2 = ⊤ | x)dx
=
∫
f(x)P (m < x)dx×
∫
f(x)P (0 > x)dx
= F (m)× (1− F (0)) > 0
where F (x) is the distribution function of the noisy
threshold.
Actually, the right decomposition should be
V (v) =
∏
i:vi=⊥
P [vi = ⊥|v<i]
∏
i:vi=⊤
P [vi = ⊤|v<i]
=
∏
i:vi=⊥
∫
f(x|v<i)P [vi = ⊥|x,v<i]dx
×
∏
i:vi=⊤
∫
f(x|v<i)P [vi = ⊤|x,v<i]dx
=
∏
i:vi=⊥
∫
f(x|v<i)P [vi = ⊥|x]dx
×
∏
i:vi=⊤
∫
f(x|v<i)P [vi = ⊤|x]dx
Algorithm 3 Attack Algorithm
Input: Dataset D with domain T , privacy param ǫ
Output: A partitioning of the domain P = {P1, . . . , Pp}
1: Let Q ← {diff(xu, xv) | ∀u, v ∈ T }
2: Let θ ← ⌈ 1
ǫ
log
(
1
δ
)⌉
3: Run GPTT(ǫ1 = ǫ, ǫ2 =∞) on database D, queries
Q and threshold θ.
4: ∀v ∈ T , Let larger(v) be the set {u ∈ T |
GPTT outputs ⊤ for diff(xu, xv)}
5: Construct ordered partition of the domain P =
{P1, . . . , Pp}, such that
∀u, v ∈ Pi, larger(u) = larger(v), and
∀u ∈ Pi, v ∈ Pi+1, larger(v) ( larger(u)
6: return P
5. RECONSTRUCTING THE DATA US-
ING GPTT
In the last section, we showed that generalized pri-
vate threshold testing does not satisfy ǫ-differential pri-
vacy for any ǫ. While this is an interesting result, it
still leaves open whether GPTT indeed leaks a signif-
icant amount of information from the dataset, and al-
lows attacks like re-identification of individuals based
on quasi-identifiers. In this section, we answer this
question in the affirmative, and show that generalized
private threshold testing may disclose the exact counts
of domain values. Exact disclosure of cells with small
counts (especially, cells with counts 0, 1 and 2) reveal
the presence of unique individuals in the data who can
be susceptible to reidentification attacks.
We will show our attack for the special case of GPTT
where ǫ2 =∞. Since GPTT with finite ǫ2 can be made
to leak as much information about a set of queries as
GPTT with ǫ2 =∞ (Theorem 4) with high probability,
we will not separately consider that case.
In our attack, we use a set of difference queries that
compute the difference between the counts of pairs of
domain elements.
Definition 4 (Difference Query). Let u1, u2 ∈
T be a pair of domain elements, and let x1 and x2
be their counts in a dataset D. The difference query
diff(u1, u2) is given by
diff(u1, u2) = x1 − x2
Note that each diff(u, v) query has sensitivity ∆ = 1.
Our attack algorithm is defined in Algorithm 3. Given
the input dataset D with domain T , we apply GPTT
(ǫ2 = ∞) to the set of all difference queries using all
pairs of domain elements u, v ∈ T . We use a threshold
θ = ⌈ 1
ǫ
log
(
1
δ
)⌉. Pairs of domain elements u, v ∈ T are
grouped together if for all w ∈ T , GPTT outputs the
same value for both diff(u, w) and diff(v, w). This
results in a partitioning of the domain. Further, for
every domain element u, we define larger(u) to be the
set of v ∈ T such that GPTT output ⊤ for diff(v, u).
These are the domain elements that satisfy xv−xu > θ˜,
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where θ˜ is the noisy threshold. We order the partitions
such that elements u ∈ Pi have a bigger larger(u) set
than elements v ∈ Pj , for j > i.
We can show that the ordered partitioning P imposes
an ordering on the counts in the database D.
Lemma 1. Let D be a database on domain T . Let
P = {P1, . . . , Pp} be the ordered paritioning of T output
by Algorithm 3. Then with probability at least 1− δ, for
all 1 ≤ ℓ < m ≤ p, ui ∈ Pℓ, uj ∈ Pm, we have xi < xj.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ ℓ < m ≤ p, and let θ˜ be the noisy
threshold. Since θ = ⌈ 1
ǫ
log
(
1
δ
)⌉, with probability at
least 1 − δ, θ˜ > 0. For any ui ∈ Pℓ and uj ∈ Pm,
larger(uj) ( larger(ui). Therefore, there exists uk ∈ T
such that xk − xi > θ˜, but xk − xj 6> θ˜. Therefore,
xi < xj .
Let Si ⊂ T denote the set of domain elements that
have count equal to i in dataset D. It is easy to see
that for every Si there is some P ∈ P output by Al-
gorithm 3 such that Si ⊆ P . We next show that for
certain datasets there is an m > 0 such that the sets
corresponding to small counts 0 ≤ i ≤ m are exactly
reproduced in the partitioning output by Algorithm 3.
Theorem 6. Let P = {P0, P1, . . . , Pp} be the ordered
partition output by Algorithm 3 on D with parameter ǫ.
Let D be a dataset such that Si 6= ∅ for all i ∈ [0, k].
That is, D contains at least one domain element with
count equal to 0, 1, 2, . . . , k. Let α = ⌈ 1
ǫ
log 1
δ
⌉. If k >
2α then with probability at least 1− δ, for all i ∈ [0, m],
Pi = Si, where m = k − 2α.
Proof. Since θ = α = ⌈ 1
ǫ
log 1
δ
⌉, with probability at
least 1− δ, the noisy threshold θ˜ will be within [0, 2α].
For the dataset D such that Si 6= ∅ for all i ∈ [0, k],
where k > 2α, for any i ∈ [0, m − 1], suppose u ∈ Si
and v ∈ Si+1, then we have larger(u) = {z | xz > θ˜+ i}
and larger(v) = {z | xz > θ˜ + i+ 1}.
Since i ∈ [0,m], with probability at least 1−δ, θ˜+i ≤
m + 2α < k. Thus ∅ 6= S⌈θ˜+i⌉ ⊂ larger(u) \ larger(v).
So we have larger(v) ( larger(u) and Si,Si+1 will not
appear in the same Pi ∈ P .
Furthermore, since we know S0, . . . Sm belong to sepa-
rate Pi and we have P = {P0, P1, . . . , Pp} be the ordered
partition. Thus, we have Pi = Si for i ∈ [0, m].
Theorem 6 shows that for datasets that have at least
one domain element having a count equal to i for all
i ∈ [0, k], we can exactly tell the counts for those domain
elements with count in [0, k−2α] with high probability.
A number of datasets satisfy the assumption that counts
in [0, k] all have support. For instance, for datasets that
are drawn from a Zipfian distribution, the size of Si is
in expectation inversely proportional to the count i, and
thus all small counts will have support for datasets of
sufficiently large size.
We also find that a number of real world datasets sat-
isfy the assumption that counts in [0, k] all have support.
Datasets Domain Scale k
Adult 4096 17665 15
MedicalCost 4096 9415 26
Income 4096 20787122 98
HEPTH 4096 347414 275
Table 1: Overview of some real world datasets
Algorithm 4 Reconstruct Algorithm
Input: Dataset D with domain T , privacy param ǫ
Output: A reconstruction of D
1: Split the budget ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2
2: P ← Attack Algorithm(D, ǫ1)
3: for P ∈ P do
4: c˜P ← count(P ) + Lap( 1ǫ2 )
5: aP ← c˜P|P |
6: We guess the count of cells in P is round(aP )
7: end for
Table 1 shows the features of some real world datasets.
Adult is a histogram constructed from U.S. Census
data [5] on the “capitol loss” attribute. MedicalCost is
a histogram of personal medical expenses from the sur-
vey [1]. Income is the histogram on “personal income”
attribute from [8]. HEPTH is a histogram constructed
using the citation network among high energy physics
pre-prints on arXiv. The attributes Domain and Scale
in Table 1 correspond to the size of T and the number
of tuples in the datasets. The feature k for each dataset
means that Si 6= ∅ for all i ∈ [0, k].
However, the above attack assumes some prior knowl-
edge about the dataset. Specifically, we assume that the
attacker know k such that all counts in [0, k] have sup-
port in the input dataset. Next we present an extension
of our attack that allows reconstructing counts in the
dataset without any prior knowledge about the dataset,
but with differentially private access to the dataset.
Emperical Data Reconstruction
Algorithm 4 outlines an attack for reconstructing a
dataset using GPTT and differentially private access to
the dataset. Algorithm 4 also takes as input a privacy
budget ǫ. We split the budget ǫ = ǫ1 + ǫ2. We use
ǫ1 to run our GPTT based attack algorithm (Alg 3),
which outputs an ordered partition P of the domain.
We use the remaining budget ǫ2 to compute noisy total
counts c˜P for each partition P ∈ P , and estimate the
average count in each partition aP = c˜P /|P |. We round
this average to the nearest integer and guess that each
domain element ui ∈ P has count round(aP ).
We run Algorithm 4 on the four datasets. Table 2
shows the fraction of domain elements in each dataset
whose counts are correctly guessed by our algorithm for
ǫ ∈ {1, 0.5, 0.1}. Each accuracy measure is the average
of 10 repetitions. In each experiment, we set ǫ1 = ǫ2 =
0.5ǫ. When ǫ is not small, the counts of most cells can
be reconstructed (3 datasets can even be reconstructed
over 90% ). With the decreasing of the ǫ, the ratio
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ǫ = 1.0 ǫ = 0.5 ǫ = 0.1
Adult 0.994 0.991 0.981
MedicalCost 0.985 0.977 0.949
Income 0.798 0.741 0.636
HEPTH 0.904 0.795 0.477
Table 2: Emperical datasets reconstruction on
different ǫ
# of cells ǫ = 1.0 ǫ = 0.5 ǫ = 0.1
Adult 4062 0.999 0.997 0.992
MedicalCost 3878 1.0 1.0 0.960
Income 2369 1.0 1.0 0.979
HEPTH 1153 1.0 1.0 0.970
Table 3: Emperical reconstruction accuracy on
cells with small counts within [0, 5]
becomes smaller. Two reasons explain this result: (1)
Small ǫ1 leads to a coarser partition from the Attack
Algorithm. (2) Small ǫ2 introduces much noise to the
counts of each group giving us wrong counts.
Table 3 displays the accuracy of reconstruction on do-
main elements with small counts within [0, 5]. Note that
more than 1/4th of the domain has counts in [0, 5] for
all the datasets. More than 95% of all domain elements
with small counts within [0, 5] can be reconstructed for
all these 4 datasets under all settings of ǫ considered.
Especially, when the ǫ is not small (e.g.,ǫ = 1.0), nearly
all these cells can be accurately reconstructed by using
Algorithm 4.
Discussion: These results show that not only does
GPTT not satisfy differential privacy, it can lead to sig-
nificant loss of privacy. Since cells with small counts
can be reconstructed with very high accuracy (> 95%),
access to the data via GPTT can result in releasing
query answers that can allow re-identification attacks.
Hence, we believe that systems whose privacy stems
from GPTT are not safe to use.
6. CONCLUSION
We studied the privacy properties of a variant of the
sparse vector technique called generalized private thresh-
old testing (GPTT). This technique is claimed to satisfy
differential privacy and has impressive utility proper-
ties and has found applications in developing privacy
preserving algorithms for frequent itemset mining, syn-
thetic data generation and feature selection in machine
learning. We show that the technique does not satisfy
differential privacy. Moreover, we present attack algo-
rithms that allows us to reconstruct counts from the
input dataset (especially small counts) with high accu-
racy with no prior knowledge about the dataset. Thus,
we demonstrate that GPTT is not a safe technique to
use on datasets with privacy concerns.
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